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OPINION 1 
Have Ecosystem Services been oversold? 2 
Jonathan Silvertown, Institute of Evolutionary Biology, Ashworth Laboratories, Charlotte 3 
Auerbach Rd, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH9 3FL, Scotland, UK. 4 
The concept of ecosystem services (ES) neatly encapsulates the ways in which 5 
human society depends upon the existence and functioning of nature, but also draws 6 
power by chiming with dominant neoliberal ideology. Scientific paradigms such as 7 
this have an inherent tendency to stop adherents from recognising alternative 8 
approaches. It is high time to examine whether the concept is being oversold with 9 
potentially damaging consequences. Many authors have questioned the monetisation 10 
of ES, but the origin of the problem lies deeper in anthropocentrism. By illustration 11 
with alternatives, I attempt to show how the ES paradigm has constrained thought, 12 
particularly towards the monetisation and financialisation of nature, even when many 13 
ecologists and others oppose this trend. 14 
From metaphor to tradable commodity 15 
Since 2005 when ecosystem services were given prominence in the Millennium Ecosystem 16 
Assessment [1], the concept has become the dominant paradigm framing research and 17 
policy making in biodiversity, ecology and conservation biology. At the same time, major 18 
nature conservation organizations have refocused their missions towards the needs of 19 
humans [2] and 'Nature' has now been redefined as 'Natural Capital' [3]. Scientific concepts 20 
change over time and it is instructive to look back at how 'ecosystem services' developed 21 
from Arthur Tansley's original idea of the 'ecosystem'. Tansley's 1935 paper [4] provided us 22 
with the abstract concept of nature that was necessary to start thinking about function (Table 23 
1). Once ecosystem functions were defined, they could become commodified, valued and 24 
then monetised. The idea that nature has a use value has historical roots in philosophy and 25 
economics. Classical economists recognised nature as a source of use value, but attributed 26 
the exchange value belonging, for example, to a stand of trees as deriving from the 27 
ownership of the land on which the trees stood or to the labour involved in turning them into 28 
merchantable timber, not directly to the trees themselves [5]. In the same the vein, when the 29 
term 'ecosystem services' was first employed for pedagogical purposes in the ecological 30 
literature of the 1980s, it was usually as a metaphor for the use value of nature. Valuing 31 
nature does not necessarily mean monetising it, but it seems that the two are hard to 32 
separate. Attempts had already been made in previous decades to place a monetary value 33 
on "nature's services" [6], for example in order to estimate the external cost of damage done 34 
by pollution [7].  35 
Table 1 here 36 
The transformation of ecosystem services into exchange values, which has now reached 37 
industrial proportions, continues to be motivated by the idea that nature will benefit if the 38 
external costs of actions that exploit or damage ecosystems are made explicit [8]. Nature will 39 
then 1) be preserved on account of its recognised true exchange value, 2) gain if the higher 40 
price in the market caused by including external costs reduces demand for the damaging 41 
activity and/or 3) be compensated to restore damage. This is the logic variously behind the 42 
Payment for Ecosystem Services programme of the Global Environment Facility [9], carbon 43 
and emissions trading [10], and the REDD+ programme (Reducing Emissions from 44 
Deforestation and Degradation) [11]. Once markets in a commodity exist, it is but a small 45 
and seemingly inevitable step to financialisation (Table 1), in which derivatives of the 46 
underlying ecosystem services become tradeable assets. 47 
Table 2 here 48 
A milestone in the monetisation of ES was reached in 1997 when Costanza et al. [12] 49 
published a dollar estimate of the value of the ecosystem services of the entire planet (Table 50 
2). Clearly anticipating that the validity of the exercise would be challenged, the authors 51 
contended that "although ecosystem valuation is certainly difficult and fraught with 52 
uncertainties, one choice we do not have is whether or not to do it." This explicit statement 53 
illustrates how the Monetised Ecosystem Services (MES) paradigm seeks to define the 54 
legitimate boundaries of thought. Although Costanza et al. were heavily criticised and even 55 
derided [13], the paper went on to be cited more than 4,000 times and the global estimate 56 
was updated and the imperative to monetise was reiterated by Costanza et al. in 2014 [14].  57 
Alternatives 58 
Contrary to the claim that there is no choice about how we define nature, there are clear 59 
alternatives to each one of the conceptual developments that has taken place, from 60 
Tansley's initial abstraction to the current trend of financialisation (Table 1). Whether one 61 
believes that any of these conceptual developments is right or wrong, it is important to 62 
appreciate that all have involved choices that have, often invisibly, shaped our thinking about 63 
nature. 64 
In his book What Money Can't Buy [15], political scientist and philosoper Michael Sandel 65 
argues that society can and does choose not to place a price on certain things and that it is 66 
morally right to reject market valuation in a range of important cases. For example, people 67 
are not allowed to sell their organs or their children. These have an intrinsic value that is 68 
beyond price. Sandel discusses how the political dominance of neoliberalism - the 69 
philosophy that seeks the de-regulation of markets and the privatisation of all possible goods 70 
and services - has caused market concepts and practices to enter more and more areas 71 
where once they were absent or even anathema. He argues that markets degrade certain 72 
goods and practices by turning them into commodities. For example, the possibility that 73 
nature has intrinsic, existential value of its own that is independent of its use to humans 74 
cannot be accommodated by the market since nature itself is not an actor in that market. 75 
Nature is devalued by monetisation. All non-commercial notions are invisible to "the one-76 
eyed imperatives" of capital [16].  77 
Box 1. Make-believe markets, about here 78 
Ecological economists can go to great, one might even think absurd, lengths to try to make 79 
the invisible visible (See Box: Make-believe markets). Biodiversity and ecological complexity 80 
can easily become casualties of the market's need for a single number that represents 81 
value. In 2012, one of the lead authors of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 82 
complained in an article in this journal that the role of species in supplying the services that 83 
ecosystems provide was being obscured by a confusion between biodiversity and 84 
ecosystem services. Mace et al. [17] wrote that "In some cases, the two terms (biodiversity 85 
and ecosystem services) are used almost synonymously, implying that they are effectively 86 
the same thing and that if ecosystem services are managed well, biodiversity will be retained 87 
and vice versa." Addressing the same issue, Peterson et al. [18] argue that obscuring the 88 
role of the biota in ecosystems is a direct consequence of replacing the concept of 89 
ecosystem function with that of ecosystem services.  90 
Sandel [15] demonstrates that the decision to attach a price to something is ultimately a 91 
moral choice, not a scientific, logical or even economic imperative. This is of course at 92 
variance with the MES paradigm that insists that we have no such choice [12]. The issue of 93 
whether monetisation is essential or not defines two different approaches to ecosystem 94 
services. On the one hand where monetisation is optional, it is used mainly as a metaphor, 95 
while on the other monetisation is the very purpose of redefining ecosystem functions as 96 
ecosystem services. If we folllow Sandel's argument that monetisation is an option not an 97 
imperative, we can then ask when it is appropriate to monetise and then use the approach 98 
pragmatically [19]. 99 
Do markets actually protect biodiversity and ecosystem function? 100 
The acid test of the MES paradigm is whether placing a price on biodiversity and ecosystem 101 
function actually leads to greater protection and improvement, or merely puts a price on 102 
destruction. The literature contains a great many examples of the monetary valuation of 103 
ecosystem services made in order to demonstrate ES value [20], but the evidence that this 104 
monetisation has itself resulted in benefits that would not otherwise accrue is almost always 105 
missing. Perhaps the largest number of case studies has been collated by the TEEB project 106 
(The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) which has summaries of 122 MES 107 
initiatives from all over the world on its website [21]. Most of the TEEB case studies were 108 
compiled in 2010 when the main TEEB report was published [22] and very few contain any 109 
evaluation of whether the projects that are described improved biodiversity or ES. The 110 
purpose of TEEB was "to show how economic concepts and tools can help equip society 111 
with the means to incorporate the values of nature into decision making at all levels" [22]. 112 
Evidence that doing this would actually benefit biodiversity is absent from the report and a 113 
recent update published in 2014 is similarly lacking [23]. 114 
A key idea in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) and in the promotion of the 115 
concept of ES was that because humans are dependent upon ES, actions that protect ES 116 
can also benefit humans. Howe et al. [24] conducted a meta-analysis of a sample of the 117 
ecosystem services literature to test whether win-wins of the kind envisaged in the MEA 118 
were common compared to trade-offs in which gains in human welfare were made at the 119 
expense of ES. They concluded that win-wins are the exception rather than the rule and that 120 
trade-offs are more likely in situations where private interests or markets are present. 121 
Many of the TEEB case studies involve monetisation for accountancy purposes only and do 122 
not involve genuine markets. It ought to be easier to tell whether monetisation has benefits 123 
in situations where actual markets exist. Two clear examples involve (1) payment for 124 
ecosystem services (PES), and (2) wildlife trade. A review of PES published in 2014 found 125 
that there was insufficient evidence to decide whether it generally works as intended or not 126 
[25]. One reason for this is that PES markets tend to be highly artificial, often being 127 
designed, or morphing into, schemes to distribute government subsidies to farmers [26]. A 128 
recognised problem with PES as a global strategy is that it rewards property owners and 129 
thereby increases wealth inequalities [27, 28], which is contrary to the principles of 130 
sustainable development.  131 
The wildlife trade is undoubtedly the most absolute form of market for biodiversity and 132 
should be the best test of what critics describe as the MES strategy of “selling species to 133 
save them” [29]. The international trade in wildlife is regulated by the Convention on 134 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) which restricts or bans trade in more 135 
than 30, 000 species. In 1989 the 173 parties to CITES decided to protect African Elephants 136 
by closing the international market for ivory, with the result that numbers rose by an 137 
estimated 140,000 in the 8 years following the ban [30]. Unfortunately, domestic markets in 138 
ivory continued to operate within four African states, providing poachers in adjacent 139 
countries with an outlet under the cover of the legal market. Poaching and illegal trade have 140 
now reached devastating levels that are causing a global decline in African Elephants [31]. It 141 
could be argued that this is not the responsibility of markets per se, but of illegal trading. 142 
However, the evidence is that markets and illegal activity are bedfellows and that even when 143 
operating within the law, large corporations rig markets for their own benefit [10]. Since 144 
2008, it has become clear that the financial markets are not immune to illegal and risky 145 
behaviour on a scale that has threatened the stability of the entire global economy. Is it wise 146 
to stake the survival of 30,000 species on a bet that they can be saved by the market, legal 147 
or otherwise? 148 
Indeed, even within the MES paradigm itself it is recognised that speculators could profit 149 
from the increasing rarity of valuable species as this would increase their price in the market 150 
[32]. There is a market in extinction. This has already brought Bluefin Tuna and Black Rhino 151 
to the brink and is possibly doing so now for African Elephants. Ultimately, if there is a 152 
market for a species, or if it occupies habitat where the land would be more valuable housing 153 
people or corporations, then market efficiency can dictate its extinction [33]. From a MES 154 
perspective, the logical answer to this situation would be for those who want to save 155 
threatened species to put their money where their mouths are and outbid the threat – 156 
effectively paying for the preservation of the desired ecosystem service (PES). This does 157 
occur when land for nature conservation is bought on the open market, but it happens out of 158 
necessity and it is a tactic, not a sustainable global strategy. If it were to become a strategy, 159 
we should have to accept that nature is a private resource and not a public good and that we 160 
can only have the nature that we can personally afford. As ever with markets, the poor will 161 
be further impoverished [34]. 162 
There is another important difference between one-off tactical purchases of habitat to protect 163 
ES and strategic MES. Tactical purchases, for example to add land to a national park or 164 
protected area, can achieve permanent protection against present and future threats. In 165 
contrast, strategic MES can achieve short-term protection, but also exposes biodiversity and 166 
ES to the vagaries of the market. Some iconic examples of MES have fallen foul of this 167 
hazard. Mexican free-tail bats feed on aerial insects including pests of cotton in the 168 
southwestern United States. The value of pest-control by bats was estimated to be $23.96 169 
million in 1990, but falls in the price of cotton and the introduction by farmers of bt-varieties 170 
that are engineered to be resistant to caterpillars combined to reduce the value of this 171 
service to only $4.88 million in 2008 [35].  172 
In Costa Rica, a study found that coffee plantations benefitted from lower levels of pests 173 
when surrounding bird habitats were preserved. Then, a fall in the market price of coffee 174 
caused farmers to switch to growing pineapples instead and forest habitats as well as coffee 175 
plantations were replaced with the more profitable crop [29]. There is a close parallel 176 
between MES today and the field of economic ornithology which flourished in the 1880s - 177 
1920s. This sought to monetise the value of wild birds in pest control and a wide range of 178 
other services, from use as carrier pigeons for the military to supplying the ingredients of 179 
birds' nest soup [36]. Unlike MES, economic ornithology explicitly recognised that wild birds 180 
could be economically injurious, for example in carrying disease. Economic ornithology had 181 
some success in controlling the wanton destruction of wild birds, but its main raison d'être 182 
was destroyed by the introduction of chemical pesticides. The clear lesson from both the 183 
historical and contemporary examples of MES is that relying mainly on monetised values 184 
puts biodiversity at the mercy of changeable markets and advancing technology. 185 
These flawed attempts to use MES to justify the protection of biodiversity contrast with a 186 
recent success in forest protection in Britain. There, a popular mass-movement rejected the 187 
neoliberal policy of a government intent on privatising the nation's publically-owned forests, 188 
showing that democratic conservation action can get results where technocratic valuation 189 
fails (See Box 2).  190 
Box 2. Britain's forests: public or private? About here 191 
Ecosystem Services without markets 192 
The concepts of ecosystem services and natural capital define nature in anthropocentric 193 
terms. Whether one subscribes to this anthropocentrism or not, it is important to realise that 194 
it is an ideologically-chosen standpoint and not one dictated by science, even though 195 
humans now undoubtedly dominate the planet [37]. As a development of anthropocentrism, 196 
monetisation of ES was introduced into ecological thinking as a means to connect with policy 197 
making, but it is clear that few outside the field of ecological economics believe that MES 198 
can adequately capture the multi-faceted sense in which people value nature [19, 29, 38-44]. 199 
The widely-made assumption that monetisation and markets benefit biodiversity and ES has 200 
not been systematically tested against the evidence. I suggest that this fundamental tenet 201 
has remained untested because the MES paradigm holds that there is no alternative to 202 
monetising the value of nature [12, 14].  While this situation persists, the MES paradigm will 203 
remain immune to refutation and hence open to the charge that it is propaganda and not 204 
science. 205 
The strong claim that we are compelled to put a monetary value upon ecosystem services 206 
[12] can and should be rejected along with the whole apparatus of make-believe markets 207 
(Box.1). If we choose to take the position, which is shared by many people, that some things 208 
in nature are without price, then it is possible to use the concept of ecosystem services in a 209 
more nuanced way to build upon the moral case for biodiversity conservation and not to 210 
displace or devalue it by monetisation [42]. Two recent surveys of the opinions of 211 
professional conservationists towards ES monetisation and the market reported that most of 212 
them, including MES sceptics, were pragmatic about its use [43, 45]. From this perspective, 213 
there will be occasions when it is valid and useful to calculate the monetary value of a 214 
particular ecosystem service, but even in these cases it will be important to recognise that 215 
such valuation is contingent on market conditions. Such decisions need to be made 216 
democratically and should not be obscured by false quantification of value in markets that 217 
are at best fickle and at worst corrupt. 218 
[2,982 words] 219 
Acknowledgements 220 
I am grateful for comments on drafts of this paper to Bill Adams, James Bullock, Richard 221 
Ennos, Muki Haklay, Georgina Mace, Marc Metzger, Guy Midgley, Isla Myers-Smith and 222 
Rissa de la Paz.  223 
References 224 
1 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) Ecosystems and human well-being: synthesis. 225 
Island Press 226 
2 Doak, D.F., et al. (2014) What is the future of conservation? Trends in Ecology & Evolution 227 
29, 77-81 228 
3 Daily, G.C., et al. (2011) Mainstreaming natural capital into decisions. In Natural Capital. 229 
Theory and practice of mapping ecosystem services (Kareiva, P.M., et al., eds), pp. 3-14, 230 
Oxford University Press 231 
4 Tansley, A.G. (1935) The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms. Ecology 232 
16, 284-307 233 
5 Gómez-Baggethun, E., et al. (2010) The history of ecosystem services in economic theory 234 
and practice: From early notions to markets and payment schemes. Ecological Economics 235 
69, 1209-1218 236 
6 Baveye, P.C., et al. (2013) Monetary valuation of ecosystem services: It matters to get the 237 
timeline right. Ecological Economics 95, 231-235 238 
7 Westman, W.E. (1977) How much are nature's services worth? Science 197, 960-964 239 
8 Kruger, O. (2005) The role of ecotourism in conservation: panacea or Pandora's box? 240 
Biodiversity and Conservation 14, 579-600 241 
9 Cavelier, J. and Gray, I.M. (2014) GEF Investments on Payments for Ecosystem Services. 242 
pp. 21 243 
10 Spash, C.L. (2010) The Brave New World of Carbon Trading. New Political Economy 15, 244 
169-195 245 
11 Corbera, E. (2012) Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in payments for ecosystem 246 
services. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4, 612-619 247 
12 Costanza, R., et al. (1997) The value of the world's ecosystem services and natural 248 
capital. Nature 387, 253-260 249 
13 Nature (1998) Audacious bid to value the planet whips up a storm. Nature 395, 430-430 250 
14 Costanza, R., et al. (2014) Changes in the global value of ecosystem services. Global 251 
Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions 26, 152-158 252 
15 Sandel, M.J. (2012) What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. Allen Lane 253 
16 Robertson, M.M. (2006) The nature that capital can see: science, state, and market in the 254 
commodification of ecosystem services. Environment and Planning D-Society & Space 24, 255 
367-387 256 
17 Mace, G.M., et al. (2012) Biodiversity and ecosystem services: a multilayered 257 
relationship. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 27, 19-26 258 
18 Peterson, M.J., et al. (2010) Obscuring Ecosystem Function with Application of the 259 
Ecosystem Services Concept. Conservation Biology 24, 113-119 260 
19 Kallis, G., et al. (2013) To value or not to value? That is not the question. Ecological 261 
Economics 94, 97-105 262 
20 Kareiva, P.M., et al. (2011) Natural Capital. Theory and practice of mapping ecosystem 263 
services. Oxford University Press 264 
21 TEEB ([Accessed 11 March 2015]) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Case 265 
Studies. TEEB http://www.teebweb.org/resources/case-studies/ 266 
22 TEEB (2010) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the 267 
Economics of Nature: A synthesis of the approach, conclusions and recommendations of 268 
TEEB., UNEP 269 
23 Sukhdev, P., et al. (2014) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity TEEB 270 
Challenges and Responses. In Nature in the Balance: The Economics of Biodiversity (Helm, 271 
D. and Hepburn, C., eds) 272 
24 Howe, C., et al. (2014) Creating win-wins from trade-offs? Ecosystem services for human 273 
well-being: A meta-analysis of ecosystem service trade-offs and synergies in the real world. 274 
Global Environmental Change 28, 263-275 275 
25 Miteva, D.A., et al. (2014) Do Biodiversity Policies Work? The Case for Conservation 276 
Evaluation. In Nature in the Balance: The Economics of Biodiversity (Helm, D. and Hepburn, 277 
C., eds), Oxford University Press 278 
26 Shapiro-Garza, E. (2013) Contesting the market-based nature of Mexico's national 279 
payments for ecosystem services programs: Four sites of articulation and hybridization. 280 
Geoforum 46, 5-15 281 
27 McAfee, K. (2012) The Contradictory Logic of Global Ecosystem Services Markets. 282 
Development and Change 43, 105-131 283 
28 Kronenberg, J. and Hubacek, K. (2013) Could Payments for Ecosystem Services Create 284 
an "Ecosystem Service Curse"? Ecology and Society 18 285 
29 McCauley, D.J. (2006) Selling out on nature. Nature 443, 27-28 286 
30 Lemieux, A.M. and Clarke, R.V. (2009) The international ban on ivory sales and its 287 
effects on elephant poaching in Africa. British Journal of Criminology 49, 451-471 288 
31 Wittemyer, G., et al. (2014) Illegal killing for ivory drives global decline in African 289 
elephants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 290 
America 111, 13117-13121 291 
32 Burgess, J.C., et al. (2014) On the Potential for Speculation to Threaten Biodiversity 292 
Loss. In Nature in the Balance: The Economics of Biodiversity (Helm, D. and Hepburn, C., 293 
eds), Oxford University Press 294 
33 Freeman, M.C. and Groom, B. (2013) Biodiversity valuation and the discount rate 295 
problem. Accounting Auditing & Accountability Journal 26, 715-745 296 
34 Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2014) Inequality in the long run. Science 344, 838-843 297 
35 Lopez-Hoffman, L., et al. (2014) Market Forces and Technological Substitutes Cause 298 
Fluctuations in the Value of Bat Pest-Control Services for Cotton. Plos One 9 299 
36 Kronenberg, J. (2014) What can the current debate on ecosystem services learn from the 300 
past? Lessons from economic ornithology. Geoforum 55, 164-177 301 
37 Lewis, S.L. and Maslin, M.A. (2015) Defining the anthropocene. Nature 519, 171-180 302 
38 Winthrop, R.H. (2014) The strange case of cultural services: Limits of the ecosystem 303 
services paradigm. Ecological Economics 108, 208-214 304 
39 Adams, W.M. (2014) The value of valuing nature. Science 346, 549-551 305 
40 Schroter, M., et al. (2014) Ecosystem Services as a Contested Concept: A Synthesis of 306 
Critique and Counter-Arguments. Conservation Letters 7, 514-523 307 
41 Vatn, A. (2000) The environment as a commodity. Environmental Values 9, 493-509 308 
42 Norton, B.G. and Noonan, D. (2007) Ecology and valuation: Big changes needed. 309 
Ecological Economics 63, 664-675 310 
43 Fisher, J.A. and Brown, K. (2014) Ecosystem services concepts and approaches in 311 
conservation: Just a rhetorical tool? Ecological Economics 108, 257-265 312 
44 Spash, C.L. (2011) Terrible Economics, Ecosystems and Banking. Environmental Values 313 
20, 141-145 314 
45 Sandbrook, C.G., et al. (2013) What do conservationists think about markets? Geoforum 315 
50, 232-240 316 
46 Scales, I.R. (2015) Paying for nature: what every conservationist should know about 317 
political economy. Oryx 49, 226-231 318 
47 Heal, G. (2000) Valuing ecosystem services. Ecosystems 3, 24-30 319 
48 Loftus, A. and March, H. (2015) Financialising nature? Geoforum 60, 172-175 320 
49 Spangenberg, J.H. and Settele, J. (2010) Precisely incorrect? Monetising the value of 321 
ecosystem services. Ecological Complexity 7, 327-337 322 
50 MacMillan, D., et al. (2006) Contingent valuation: Environmental polling or preference 323 
engine? Ecological Economics 60, 299-307 324 
51 Zander, K.K., et al. (2014) Threatened Bird Valuation in Australia. Plos One 9 325 
52 Clark, J., et al. (2000) "I struggled with this money business": respondents' perspectives 326 
on contingent valuation. Ecological Economics 33, 45-62 327 
53 Forestry_Commission (2011) Woodland area, planting and restocking - 2011 edition. 328 
Forestry Commission http://www.forestry.gov.uk/forestry/INFD-8GKKG4 329 
54 Edlin, H.L. (1972) Trees, woods and man. Collins 330 
55 Rackham, O. (2006) Woodlands. Collins 331 
56 Willis, K.G. (1991) The recreational value of the forestry commission estate in Great 332 
Britain - A Clawson-Knetsch travel cost analysis. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 38, 333 
58-75 334 
57 Hodge, I.D. and Adams, W.M. (2014) Property institutions for rural land conservation: 335 
Towards a post-neoliberal agenda. Journal of Rural Studies 36, 453-462 336 
 337 
 338 
  339 
Glossary 340 
Contingent Valuation (CV) A method used in economics to place a monetary value upon 341 
non-market goods and services by asking people the hypothetical question of how much 342 
they would be willing to pay for them. 343 
Devaluing by monetisation Reducing the intrinsic worth of nature by attaching a monetary 344 
value to it. 345 
Ecosystem function The ecological processes that take place in an ecosystem, including 346 
photosynthetic fixation of CO2, decomposition, nutrient uptake and population processes at 347 
all trophic levels. 348 
Ecosystem Services (ES) The goods and services of use to humans that are directly 349 
attributable to the ecological functioning of ecosystems. 350 
Exchange value The price at which an item is bought and sold in the market. 351 
External cost The cost to the environment of damage or exploitation that is not reflected in 352 
the market price of the goods or services produced. For example the price of aviation fuel 353 
does not reflect the environmental costs of burning it. 354 
Make-believe markets All markets are social constructs, but make-believe markets exist 355 
only in the mind of the researcher who invents them to fit reality to their model instead of 356 
fitting their model to reality. Contingent Valuation is a tool that depends on make-believe 357 
markets. 358 
Monetised Ecosystem Services (MES) Ecosystem services on which a price has been 359 
fixed. 360 
Natural capital "Earth's lands and waters and their biodiversity." [3] 361 
Neoliberalism A political and economic philosophy that seeks the de-regulation of markets 362 
and the privatisation of all possible goods and services. [46] 363 
Non-use value The value of an item attributed to its existence, not to its use. E.g. the 364 
aesthetic pleasure given by wild birds. cf. Use value 365 
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) A policy instrument that seeks to influence the 366 
supply of ecosystem services by payments from the beneficiaries to those controlling the 367 
supply. 368 
Public goods Goods that are free to all and that can be consumed without reducing their 369 
benefit to others. For example, clean air and public sanitation. 370 
Revealed Preference An indirect method of estimating the monetary value of an ecosystem 371 
service (e.g. woodland amenity) based upon how much people spend to access or travel to 372 
the site. Note that this method gives higher amenity value to a visitor who travels by car than 373 
someone who travels on foot or by bicycle, even though the former involves the least effort 374 
and is the most environmentally damaging.  375 
Use value The qualitative value of an item due to its usefulness, as distinct from its 376 
monetary value in a free market. cf. exchange value. 377 
 378 
 379 
Table 1 380 
Table 1. How the development of the Ecosystem Services paradigm has constrained thinking about nature and some alternatives to these 381 
developments. 382 
Concept of nature (date 
of introduction) 
Ontology Transformation of the 
concept of nature 
Constraint 
introduced by the 
transformation 
Alternative 
Ecosystems (1935) Ecosystem functions 
including nutrient  stocks & 
cycles, energy flow.  
Abstraction Intrinsic value of 
biodiversity can 
become secondary to 
its generic roles in 
ecosystem function 
[18]. E.g. plants are 
treated merely as 
'biomass'. 
Explicit recognition and 
inclusion in ecological 
models & thinking of 
processes at the 
individual, population and 
community levels [17]. 
Ecosystem Services Provisioning, regulating, Commodification A wholly Conservation for 
(1980s) cultural and supporting 
services [1]. See Table 1.  
anthropocentric 
concept of nature [29]. 
biodiversity's sake [2]. 
ES Values (1990s) Market prices, hedonic 
prices, travel costs, 
replacement costs, 
contingent valuation, 
discount rates  [22] 
Monetisation Reduces the intrinsic 
worth of nature to that 
which can be 
monetised [39]. 
Broader concepts of the 
value of nature [42, 47]. 
ES Markets (2000s) Markets in wildlife, 
emissions trading, Payment 
for Ecosystem Services, 
e.g. REDD+  
Marketisation Conceptualisation of 
environmental 
problems and their 
solution become 
focussed on markets, 
even when such 
markets are artificial 
[11]. 
Recognise that ES 
markets are rarely if ever a 
solution to conservation 
problems. Protect nature 
from market forces, not 
expose it to them. 
ES-based Financial Carbon permits, Financialisation Environmental Public investment in 
instruments (2000s) Biodiversity offsets, debt-
for-nature swaps, green 
investment products. 
objectives become 
secondary to financial 
ones [10] and control 
shifts from people to 
corporations [48]. 
conservation under 
democratic rather than 
market control. 
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Table 2.  385 
Summary of Monetised Ecosystem Services for the entire Earth calculated by Costanza et al. 386 
1997 [12]. 387 
Ecosystem Service Total global flow,  
$yr-1 X 109 
Gas regulation $1,341 
Climate regulation $684 
Disturbance regulation $1,779 
Water regulation $1,115 
Water supply $1,692 
Erosion control $576 
Soil formation $53 
Nutrient cycling $17,075 
Waste treatment $2,277 
Pollination $117 
Biological control $417 
Refugia $124 
Food production $1,386 
Raw materials $721 
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 393 
Genetic resources $79 
Recreation $815 
Cultural $3,015 
Total $33,268 
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Box 1. Make-believe markets 394 
A fundamental problem with ES monetisation is that there are no markets for many of the goods 395 
and services that ecosystems provide. The MES paradigm has essentially three solutions to 396 
this: 1. Invent a market, for example in carbon credits (licences to pollute), 2. Pretend there is a 397 
market and ask people how they would value ES in hypothetical situations (the Contingent 398 
Valuation method) and 3. Use a surrogate to value ES, for example the total cost to visitors of 399 
travelling by car to a natural area as the recreation value of that area (the Revealed Preference 400 
method). A significant portion of the literature on the valuation of ecosystem services is devoted 401 
to the technical issues that arise in make-believe markets [49].  402 
Contingent Valuation (CV) is a method that has been widely used for decades, but its results 403 
are particularly subjective. The response of someone asked a typical survey question such as 404 
"How much would you be willing to pay towards a project that will increase the number of Red 405 
Kites in Scotland from 59 now to 200 in ten years time", not surprisingly depends upon how 406 
much time they are given to think about it [50]. It will also depend upon their disposable income 407 
and whether they can suspend disbelief in the fiction that has been presented to them. More 408 
than half the people interviewed in an Australian CV study said that they would not be willing to 409 
pay anything at all towards the protection of endangered birds, even though over 80% said they 410 
would be upset if a bird went extinct [51].  411 
Such differences between people's feelings about extinction when expressed in monetary and 412 
non-monetary ways shows just how misleading ES monetisation can be. Far from protecting 413 
species by valuing them as is claimed, MES weakens the case for protection because it ignores 414 
the moral feeling people have against extinction unless they are rich and/or compliant enough to 415 
place a price upon this. A study that interviewed participants in a CV exercise after the survey 416 
had taken place found that respondents had a much more sophisticated and multi-dimensional 417 
sense of the value of nature than the Willingness-to-Pay questions that they were asked allowed 418 
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them to express [52]. The study authors reported that "There was a feeling of moral outrage... 419 
that a monetary sum was being used as a measure of what individuals saw as their ethical and 420 
moral values for nature." Participants rejected the idea that the CV exercise was a legitimate 421 
way in which to decide an environmental issue and wanted instead a process in which local 422 
people, scientists and policy makers could all participate through dialogue. 423 
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Box 2. Britain's forests: public or private? 426 
Britain is one of the least wooded countries in Europe, with only 13% of land area under forest 427 
[53]. Over a quarter of this is owned or managed by the Forestry Commission which was set up 428 
in 1919 to ensure that the timber shortage that had threatened the war effort in the First World 429 
War would not recur. Large areas of land were acquired by the Commission and planted, mainly 430 
with non-native conifers. However, when the Second World War began in 1939, even the first of 431 
the new plantations were only 20 years old and the trees in them were not usable.  432 
After WWII, planting continued on public and private land and felling was strictly regulated by 433 
licence in order to build up a strategic reserve of standing timber [54]. Ironically, as these 434 
plantations began to mature, the economics of forestry changed; the price of timber fell, the cost 435 
of labour increased and the need for a strategic reserve was challenged [55]. The Forestry 436 
Commission eventually altered its policy and began to manage forests for public amenity and 437 
nature conservation as well as for production. Economists used the indirect revealed preference 438 
method to monetise the amenity value of forests and found that visitors spent an estimated 439 
£53m on travelling by car to reach Forestry Commission sites compared to £71m earned by the 440 
organisation from timber in the same year [56].  441 
In October 2010, the recently elected government in the UK announced that it intended to 442 
privatise the forests held by the Forestry Commission. New governments with a fresh mandate 443 
expect to have their own way, but by February 2011 a storm of public opposition and half a 444 
million signatures on a petition forced the government to abandon the policy [57]. In many ways, 445 
the two sides on this issue embody the difference between how the public values nature and 446 
how it is valued within the MES paradigm. On the one side, the public value forest for its 447 
aesthetic and non-use values and object to attempts at monetisation and privatisation (Box 1). 448 
On the other is a neoliberal government for whom the MES paradigm offers a technocratic 449 
rationale for the deployment of its natural capital. Several large nature conservation 450 
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organizations expressed themselves neutral on the issue of forest privatisation, taking the view 451 
that it is regulation and not ownership that matters. In fact neoliberal governments cut regulatory 452 
agencies, as the same UK government has done in the realm of nature conservation, preferring 453 
to cede control as well as ownership to private enterprise. 454 
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